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Abstract
Recently perfectly secure steganographic systems have been described
for a wide class of sources of covertexts. The speed of transmission of
secret information for these stegosystems is proportional to the length of
the covertext. In this work we show that there are sources of covertexts
for which such stegosystems do not exist. The key observation is that
if the set of possible covertexts has a maximal Kolmogorov complexity,
then a high-speed perfect stegosystem has to have complexity of the same
order.
1 Introduction
The goal of steganography can be described as follows. Alice and Bob can
exchange messages of a certain kind (called covertexts) over a public channel.
The covertexts can be, for example, a sequence of photographic images, videos,
text emails and so on. Alice wants to pass some secret information to Bob
so that Eve, the observer, cannot notice that any hidden information is being
passed. Thus, Alice should use the covertexts to hide the secret text.
Cachin [1] suggested an information-theoretic model for steganography, along
with a definition of a perfectly secure steganographic system. According to this
model, Alice has an access to a probabilistic source of covertexts. It is usually
assumed that the secret message can be represented as a sequence of indepen-
dent equiprobable bits. She has to embed her secret message into covertexts in
such a way that Bob can decode the message. A stegosystem is called perfectly
secure if the distribution of the output is the same as the distribution at the
source of covertexts. Indeed, in this case nobody is able to distinguish containers
with hidden information and ”empty” ones (i.e. without hidden information).
Let us consider an example of a perfect stegosystem suggested in [5]. The
source of covertexts µ is as follows. It generates sequences of n independently
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identically distributed letters from some finite alphabet A, where n ∈ N is given.
For the sake of simplicity we consider the binary alphabets A = {a, b}, but the
construction can be used for the general case too [5]. The distribution µ can be
unknown to Alice and Bob. Suppose that Alice has to transmit a secret sequence
y∗ = y1y2 . . . generated by a source ω, where ω(yi = 0) = 1/2 independently for
all i ∈ N, and let there be given a covertext sequence x∗ = x1x2 . . . generated
by µ. For example, let
y∗ = 01100 . . . , x∗ = aababaaaabbaaaaabb (1)
The sequences x∗ and y∗ are encoded in a new sequence X (to be transmitted
to Bob) such that y∗ is uniquely determined by X , and the distribution of X
is the same as the distribution of x∗ (that is, µ; in other words, X and x∗ are
statistically indistinguishable).
The encoding is carried out in two steps. First we group all symbols of x∗
into pairs, and denote
aa = u, bb = u, ab = v0, ba = v1.
In our example, the sequence (1) is represented as
x∗ = aa ba ba aa ab ba aa aa bb= uv1v1uv0v1uuu
Then X is acquired from x∗ as follows: all pairs corresponding to u are left
unchanged, while all pairs corresponding to vk are transformed to pairs corre-
sponding to vy1vy2vy3 ; in our example
X = aa ab ba aa ba ab aa aa bb
Decoding is obvious: Bob groups the symbols of X into pairs, ignores all occur-
rences of aa and bb and changes ab to 0 and ba to 1.
The described stegosystem has the following properties. The sequence of
symbols output by the stegosystem obeys the same distribution µ as the input
sequence. The average length of the transmitted secret sequence is nµ(ab); in
other words, the speed of transmission of hidden information is µ(ab) secret
bits per letter of covertext. Moreover, in [5] a generalization of the described
construction is proposed, for which the speed of transmission of secret text
approaches the Shannon entropy h(µ) = −(µ(a) logµ(a) + µ(b) logµ(b)) when
n goes to infinity. In addition, a similar construction is proposed in the same
work for the case of arbitrary alphabets and for finite-alphabet Markov sources
of covertexts.
So, we can see that perfectly secure stegosystems exist for a wide class of
covertexts and, moreover, such systems are quite simple and have a high speed
of transmission of secret information. Naturally, one is interested in the ques-
tion of whether such stegosystems exist for any possible source of covertext.
This problem is of interest since sources of covertexts that are of particular
practical importance, such as texts in natural languages or photographs, do not
seem to be well-described by any known simple model. Here we answer this
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question in the negative. More precisely, it turns out that there exists such a
set of covertexts of length n for which simple stegosystems which have speed of
transmission of hidden text Ω(n) do not exist. Here simplicity is measured by
Kolmogorov complexity of the system and a stegosystem is “simple” means that
its complexity is exp(o(n)), when n goes to infinity. Kolmogorov complexity is
an intuitive notion that often helps to establish results that help to understand
the principled limitations a certain problem or model imposes; it has been used
as such in many works, see, for example, [3, 6, 9, 10].
This result can be interpreted as that there are such complicated sources
of data, that one cannot conceivably put significantly more information into
a source, without changing its characteristics, even though the entropy of the
source is very high. This may explain what is known in practice; for example,
it is apparently very hard to put any hidden message into a given text in a
natural language, without making the text “unnatural”. Of course, rather than
trying to change a given text, the communicating parties can easily agree in
advance on two texts each of which codes one secret bit, so that when the need
for communication arises, Alice can transmit one of the texts thereby passing
one bit. However, in order to communicate more than one bit, to use the same
method they would have to have a database of covertexts that is exponentially
large with respect to the message to pass. Moreover, even this stegosystem will
not be perfectly secure, since the source of covertexts with hidden information
is concentrated on a small subset of all the possible covertexts of the given
length. If the stegosystem is used once, then perhaps no reliable detection of
the hidden message is possible. If it is to be used on multiple occasions, that
is, if we wish to construct a general purpose stegosystem for transmitting, say,
δn bits with an n-bit message (for some fixed δ), we will need to construct a
database of effectively all possible covertexts. At least, this is the case for some
sources of covertexts, as the result of this work demonstrates, and it seems
likely that it is the case for such sources as texts in natural languages or even
photographic images. Thus, our result may be helpfull in clarifying the nature
of the difficulties that arise in construction of real steganographic systems which
use human-generated sources of covertexts.
2 Preliminaries
We use the following model for steganography, mainly following [1]. It is as-
sumed that Alice has an access to an oracle which generates covertexts accord-
ing to some fixed but unknown distribution of covertexts µ. Covertexts belong
to some finite alphabet A. For the sake of simplicity we consider the case
A = {0, 1}; the general case is analogous. Alice wants to use this source to
transmit hidden messages. A hidden (or secret) message is a sequence of letters
from {0, 1} generated independently with equal probabilities of 0 and 1. We de-
note the source of hidden messages by ω. This is a commonly used model for the
source of secret messages, since it is assumed that secret messages are encrypted
by Alice using a key shared only with Bob. If Alice uses the Vernam cipher (a
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one-time pad) then the encrypted messages are indeed generated according to
the Bernoulli 1/2 distribution, whereas if Alice uses modern block or stream ci-
phers then the encrypted sequence “looks like” a sequence of random Bernoulli
1/2 trials. (Here “looks like” means indistinguishable in polynomial time, or
that the likeness is confirmed experimentally by statistical data, see, e.g. [4].)
The third party, Eve is a passive adversary: Eve is reading all messages passed
from Alice to Bob and is trying to determine whether secret messages are being
passed in the covertexts or not. Clearly, if covertexts with and without hidden
information have the same probability distribution (µ) then it is impossible to
distinguish them.
Since the number of possible covertexts x in the set An is finite, using a
stegosystem once Alice can only transmit a finite number of bits of the secret
message. We tacitly assume that there are always more secret bits than Alice
wants to pass, which is formalized by assuming that Alice has an infinite secret
message (in practice, if Alice runs out of secrets, she can fill the remainder of the
message with random noise). Depending on the covertext that Alice has and
on the actual secret message, the length of the secret text that she transmits
may vary. Naturally, one wishes to maximize the expected length of the secret
message that the encoder can transmit. We require, however, that the decoding
is always correct, that is, Bob gets the whole secret message that Alice has
transmitted, without errors.
The steganographic protocol can be summarized in the following definitions.
Definition 1 (secret or hidden text). A source ω of secret text y∗ = y1, y2, . . .
is such that ω(yi = 0) = ω(yi = 1) = 1/2, independently for all i ∈ N.
Definition 2 (stegosystem). A stegosystem St is a family (indexed by n) of
pairs of functions: the encoder, that maps a pair (x, y∗) ∈ An × {0, 1}∞ (a
covertext and a secret sequence) into a pair (t, StEncn(x, (y1 . . . yt)) ∈ N× A
n:
the number of secret bits transmitted and the output covertext. The decoder
StDecn is a function from A
n to {0, 1}∗. We will often omit the parameter n
from the notation, when its value is clear.
Definition 3 (steganographic protocol). A parameter n is fixed. Alice draws a
covertext x ∈ An generated by a source of covertexts µ (a distribution on An)
and a secret message y∗ = y1, y2, . . . according to the source ω. The sources ω
and µ are independent of each other.
Given x ∈ An and y∗ Alice using a stegosystem St obtains the number of
secret bits she can pass t(x, y∗) ≥ 0, and a covertext StEnc(x, (y1 . . . yt)) ∈ A
n
that is transmitted over a public channel to Bob. (Only StEnc(x, (y1 . . . yt)) is
transmitted; the number t is not.)
Bob (and any possible observer Eve) receives x′ ∈ An and obtains using the
decoder StDec the resulting message StDecn(x
′) = y1 . . . yt.
Definition 4 (perfect security). A steganogrpahic system is called perfectly
secure if the sequence of covertexts x∗ and the steganographic sequence X have
the same distribution: Prµ×ω(StEnc = x
′) = µ(x′) for any x′ ∈ An, where the
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first probability is taken with respect to the distribution of covertexts µ and that
of secret text ω.
Definition 5 (speed of transmission). For a stegosystem St the speed of trans-
mission of secret text vn(St) is defined as Eµ×ωt(x, y
∗)/n (the expectation is
with respect to µ and ω).
Note that often (in particular, in [1]) more general steganographic protocols
are considered, allowing for non-perfect security, transmission with errors, sev-
eral draws from the source of covertexts, etc. We have decided to concentrate on
the simple model presented since it is rich enough for perfectly secure stegosys-
tems to exist, for a wide classes of sources of covertexts (e.g. all finite-memory
sources, [5]). Some possible extensions are discussed in Section 4.
For definitions, notation, and an introduction to Kolmogorov complexity,
see [3]. Informally, the Kolmogorov complexity, or algorithmic entropy, can be
defined as follows [8]: K(x) of a string x is the length (number of bits) of a
shortest binary program (string) to compute x on a fixed reference universal
computer (such as a particular universal Turing machine). Intuitively, K(x)
represents the minimal amount of information required to generate x by any
effective process. The conditional Kolmogorov complexity K(x|y) of x relative
to y is defined similarly as the length of a shortest program to compute x, if y
is furnished as an auxiliary input to the computation.
We will use some simple properties of K, such as K(s) ≤ |s|+c for any word
s, whose proofs can be found in e.g. [3]. Here it is worth noting that K(s) does
not take into account the time or extra memory it takes to compute s.
3 Main results
Theorem 1. For every δ > 0 there is a family indexed by n ∈ N of distri-
butions Pn on A
n with h(Pn) ≥ n − 1, such that every stegosystem Stn whose
Kolmogorov complexity satisfies logK(Stn) = o(n) and whose speed of trans-
mission of hidden text vn(Stn) is not less than δ, is not perfectly secure from
some n on.
Proof. We will construct a sequence of sets Xn of words of length n whose
Kolmogorov complexity is the highest possible, namely 2Ω(n). For each n ∈ N,
the distribution Pn is uniform on Xn. We will then show that, in order to have
the speed of transmission δ > 0 a perfectly secure stegosystem must be able
to generate a large portion of the set Xn, for each n. This will imply that the
complexity of such a stegosystem has to be 2Ω(n). The latter implication will
be shown to follow from the fact that, in order to transmit some information,
a stegosystem must replace the input with some output that could have been
generated by the source; this, for perfectly secure stegosystems, amounts to
knowing at least a large portion of Xn.
Fix n ∈ N and let X ⊂ An be any set such that |X | = 2n−1 and
K(X) = 2n(1 + o(1)). (2)
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The existence of such a set can be shown by a direct calculation of the number
of all subsets with 2n−1 elements; the maximal complexity is equal (up to a
constant) to the log of this value.
Assume that there is a perfectly secure stegosystem Stn for the family Pn,
n ∈ N, and let the speed of transmission of hidden text be not less than δ.
Define the set Z as the set of those words which are used as codewords Z :=
{x ∈ An : StDec(x) 6= Λ}. Since the expected speed of transmission of hidden
text is lower bounded by δ, we must have |Z| ≥ δ2n−1 (indeed, since every
word codes at most n− 1 bits, the expected speed of transmission must satisfy
(n− 1) |Z|2n−1 ≥ δn). Since St is perfectly secure Z ⊂ X . Let us lower-bound the
complexity K(Z|X\Z) of the set Z given X\Z. Given the description of X\Z
and the description of Z relative to X\Z one can reconstruct X . That is why
K(Z|X\Z) ≥ K(X) − K(X\Z) + O(1). The size of X\Z is not greater than
2n−1(1 − δ). Hence,
K(Z|X\Z) ≥ K(X)− max
|U|≤2n−1(1−δ)
K(U) +O(1). (3)
The latter maximal complexity can be calculated as follows:
max
|U|≤2n−1(1−δ)
K(U) = log
(
2n
2n−1(1 − δ)
)
+O(1).
Applying the Stirling approximation for factorial we obtain
max
|U|≤2n−1(1−δ)
K(U) ≤ 2n(1 − γ)(1 + o(1)),
where γ = 1− h(1−δ2 ,
1+δ
2 ). From this equality, (2) and (3) we get
K(Z) ≥ γ2n(1 + o(1)).
Furthermore, define Z0 as the set of words that code those secret messages
that start with 0, and Z1 those that start with 1:
Zi := {x ∈ A
n : StDec(x) = iu, u ∈ {0, 1}∗}, i ∈ {0, 1}. (4)
Clearly, Z = Z1 ∪Z0. Hence, K(Z|X\Z) ≤ K(Z0|X\Z) +K(Z1|X\Z) +O(1),
so that K(Zi|X\Z) ≥ K(Z|X\Z)/2+O(1) for some i ∈ {0, 1}. Let this i be 1.
Thus,
K(Z1|X\Z) ≥ γ2
n−1(1 + o(1)). (5)
We will next show how to obtain Z1 from Z\Z1 and the stegosystem St, thus
arriving at a contradiction with the assumption that logK(St) = o(n).
For a set T ⊂ X define
ϕ(T ) := {StEnc(x, 1u) : x ∈ T, u ∈ {0, 1}∗}.
Since St is perfectly secure, ϕ(T ) ⊂ X for every T ⊂ X . Let T0 = X\Z1, and
Tk = Tk−1 ∪ ϕ(Tk−1). Since X is finite and each Tk−1 is a subset of Tk, there
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must be such k0 ∈ N that Tk = Tk0 for all k > k0. There are two possibilities:
either Tk0 = X or X\Tk0 6= ∅. Assume the latter, and define Z
′
1 = X\Tk0.
Then to obtain an element of Z ′1 as an output of the stegosystem St, the input
must be an element of Z ′1 and a secret message that starts with 1. From this, and
from the fact that the distribution of the output is the same as the distribution
of the input (that is, St is perfectly secure), we get
Pn(Z
′
1) = Pn(Z
′
1, y = 1u) = Pn(Z
′
1)ω(1) = Pn(Z
′
1)/2,
which implies Pn(Z
′
1) = 0 and Z
′
1 = ∅. Therefore, there is a k ∈ N such that
Tk = X . This means that a description of Z1 can be obtained from a description
of X\Z1 = T0 and St. Indeed, to obtain Z1 it is sufficient to run StEnc on all
elements of T0 with all inputs starting with 1, thus obtaining T1, and then
repeat this procedure until we get Tk+1 = Tk for some k, wherefrom we know
that Tk = X and Z1 = Tk\T0. Thus,
K(Z1|X\Z1) ≤ K(St) +O(1) = 2
o(n) (6)
which contradicts (5).
4 Possible extensions
The definitions of stegosystems and steganographic protocol that we have used
allow for several extensions. In particular, we have made the requirement that
Alice can draw only one covertext from the source, in order to construct her
message. We have also required that the decoding is always correct, did not
allow for a secret key in the protocol (a secret key could be used before entering
into steganographic communication in order to obtain the secret message y∗,
but is out of scope of the protocol), etc. These requirements, along with the
requirement of perfect security, might be considered restrictive; however, as was
mentioned in the Introduction, for some sources of covertexts (such as i.i.d. or
finite-memory sources) there are indeed perfectly secure steganographic systems
that meet all the requirements we have made, and which also have the highest
possible speed of transmission of hidden text: vn(St) approaches (exponentially
fast) the Shannon entropy h(µ) of the source of covertexts, as n grows (see [5]).
This is why we have decided to sacrifice the generality for the sake of simplicity
of the model presented.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the main results of this work can be
extended to more general cases. For example, if we allow Alice and Bob to
share a secret key kn, then trivially Theorem 1 holds with K(Stn) replaced
by K(Stn) +K(kn). Let us briefly stop on another extension of the protocol.
Instead of allowing Alice to draw only one covertext from the source, we can
allow her to draw several, say, M covertexts. Given M covertexts x1, . . . , xm,
where xi ∈ A
n, and a secret sequence y∗ Alice constructs a single x′ ∈ An
which is passed (over a public channel) to Bob. In particular, depending on the
message y∗, Alice can chose xi that already encodes the message, if such xi,
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1 ≤ i ≤M exists. The speed vn of transmission of secret text is measured with
respect to what is passed over the public channel only (i.e. x′). Then Theorem 1
admits the following extension: there are such sources of covertexts, that any
perfectly secure simple stegosystem must draw Mn = 2
Ω(n) covertexts in order
to transmit δn bits, for any given δ > 0.
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